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Abstract 
 
 The purpose of the paper is to alert to a specific danger confronted by the 
postmodern supposedly anti capitalist movements. Referring to the work of Michel 
Foucault I try to demonstrate that specific danger in terms of the double character of 
freedom. Freedom according to Foucault is not only a principle of diversity but also a 
tool of management. Ignoring the management aspect of freedom and merely considering 
it as a ‘way out’ leads to the incoporation of these movements within the same power 
constellations against which they are struggling. I make my case through first situating 
postmodern struggles within an overall schema derived from the work of Michel 
Foucault. The working of the double bind of freedom in capitalist societies is described 
through a brief look at how the subjectivisation regime works in capitalism. In this 
context it is suggested that postmodern movements supposedly are aimed at creating a 
new subjectivity - a subjectivity that can break out of the double bind of the capitalist 
subjectivisation regime. However these movements fail precisely on this account. They 
more than often turn into, what Foucault pejoratively called liberation movements. 
 
 
Research 
 
  
 We do not lack communication, on the contrary we have too much of it. We lack 
creation. We lack resistance to the present. 
 
Deleuze and Guattari  (quoted in Negri and Hardt 2000: 393). 
 
 The final word on power is that resistance comes first.  
 
Deleuze (Deleuze 1988:. 89).  
 
 
The purpose of this paper is to try to understand postmodern activism in the context of a 
systematic theoretical framework. I begin my analysis through situating postmodern 
movements in the framework of a Foucauldian theorisation of struggles. Concentrating 
on the notion of subjectivity and subjectivisation, I intend to make clear a specific danger 
faced by these movements in their present constellation. 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________ 
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I. Foucault’s Theorisation of Struggles  
 
 Foucault categorises struggles, in general, into three types: 
 
¾ Struggles against domination 
¾ Struggles against exploitation  
¾ Struggles against subjection 
 
 Roughly speaking struggles against domination are struggles against the 
domination of one group over another on ethnic, social and religious bases. Struggles 
against exploitation are struggles against “the separate(ion) (of) individuals from what 
they produce” (SP: 212). And finally struggles against subjection are struggles against 
“that which ties the individual to himself and submits him to others in this (i.e. a 
particular) way (struggles against subjection, against forms of subjectivity and 
submission)” [ibid]. The defining element of subjection is  
self-subjection. No subjection exists without the possibility of self-subjection. This is the 
reason why freedom is so important for the functioning of any subjectivisation regime. It 
is the element of self-subjection that differentiates subjection from other forms of 
domination. 
 
 I shall elaborate the above point a little more by contrasting subjection with 
different forms of dominations mentioned by Foucault. The struggle against subjection is 
different from a struggle against slavery because it is not (primarily) a struggle against 
the “appropriation of bodies” (DP: 137). Similarly, the struggle against subjection is not a 
struggle against servitude. Servitude is a “constant, total, massive, non analytical, 
unlimited relationship of domination established in the form of the individual will of the 
master, his ‘caprice.’” (DP: 137). Thus, the struggle against subjection is not a struggle 
against the individual master or class of masters since the struggle against subjection is 
against the effects of anonymous power (SP: 211 and 213). 
 
 Furthermore struggles against subjection are not struggles against vassalage. 
Foucault defines the relationship of “vassalage” as “a lightly coded, but distant relation of 
submission, which (bears) less on the operation of the body than on the products of 
labour and marks of allegiance” (DP: 137). Finally, struggles against subjection are to be 
differentiated from the subjections of the monastic type. The purpose of the monastic 
type of subjection “was to obtain renunciation rather than increase utility.” (DP: 137 cf. 
HS final chapter). The purpose of capitalist subjection on the other hand is precisely to 
increase utility. 
 
 Although, the above examples are not exhaustive in any sense they are sufficient 
to clarify what Foucault might mean when he differentiates between domination and 
subjection. 
 
Similarly, we can see from these examples that subjection is a kind of domination. 
Subjection is by definition domination but not all types of domination are necessarily 
subjection. Foucault differentiates between domination and subjection to specify and 
emphasise the particular kind of domination that has been the hallmark of capitalism and 
to highlight its uniqueness among various historically existing forms of domination.  
 
 According to Foucault although all three types of struggles can be found 
coexisting in a society in a given era, normally one kind of struggle tends to dominate a 
particular society. Thus, for example, though in feudal societies struggles against 
exploitation may be found they are not the characteristic struggles of the feudal era. 
Foucault concludes that the struggles characteristic of the feudal era were struggles 
against domination. Struggles against exploitation were characteristic struggles of the 
nineteenth century. “And now - a - days”, says Foucault, “struggle against the forms of 
subjection - against the submission of subjectivity - is becoming more and more 
important” (SP: 213). According to Foucault the characteristic struggles of late/advanced 
capitalism are struggles against subjection. However, Foucault adds, this is not the first 
time in Western history that struggles around subjectivity have become prominent, and 
the examples Foucault gives leave one wondering whether these kinds of struggles are 
tied to extraordinary times in the life of Western civilisation (SP: 213).  
 
II Capitalist Subjectivisation Regime 
 
 “Subjectivity” is defined by Foucault as a form of “organisation of self 
consciousness” (PPC: 253) implying that there may be forms of organisation of self-
consciousnessother than subjectivity/subject. I define manageable subjectivity as a 
subjectivity, which has two characteristics: First, it has some degree of freedom/diversity 
and second this diversity is amenable to organisation under a singularity. We cannot talk 
of a manageable subjectivity without the presence of these two elements. Management 
techniques are not operationalisable with individuals who are not allowed freedom. One 
cannot talk of managing slaves in this sense. 
 
 In this context Foucault asserts that “power (read management!) is exercised over 
free subjects, and only insofar as they are free” (SP: 221, emphasis provided). Further 
more, this freedom/diversity should be such that it can be traced back to a  singularity. 
 Diversity that cannot be traced back to singularity leads to dangerous subjectivity, a 
 subjectivity that is not manageable (PPC: 125-151). 
 
 Thus, for the production and reproduction of manageable subjectivity, one 
requires diversity but the limit of this diversity would be the ultimate ability to retract this 
diversity and lock it into a singularity. If diversity exceeds this limit, the subjectivity no 
longer remains manageable. It enters the threshold of a dangerous subjectivity. The 
apparent paradox of capitalism is that in order to increase the utility and productive 
capacity of individuals and populations needs to expand the ambit of freedom and 
diversity but in order to make individuals and populations docile and hence governable 
and manageable, it needs to constrain this diversity by setting limits so that it remains 
manageable. It is on the maintenance of this delicate balance between diversity and 
singularity that the sustenance and continuity of the whole capitalist system 
depends.  
 
                   Capitalism resolves the dilemma through realising the double role freedom 
can  
play. Freedom is central for the functioning of a capitalist system not only as the  
precondition  
for enhancing utility and diversity, but for its double role as the precondition of 
enhancing diversity  
and imposing singularity on multiplicity (SP: 221). Historically, ‘freedom’ has played 
this  role of  
imposing singularity over multiplicity through the process of subjectivisation i.e. through 
the  
creation of a subjectivity/subject. The genius of capitalism and liberalism was to realise 
that  
freedom was not only the principle of anarchy it can also be a great tool of management 
(see  
Rose, 1993, Rizvi, 2006). 
 Foucault’s claim is that in capitalism the governance of diversity is maintained 
through freedom itself and not (primarily) through repression. Capitalism’s interests are 
not fulfilled by curbing and limitations per se.  Capitalism has evolved a system of 
government whose condition of operationalisation is freedom and immanence. Foucault 
defines “government’ as the structure (ing) of the possible field of action of others” (PPC: 
221). The capitalist logic is based on a realisation that freedom is the essential element of 
‘government’ (management) in the sense that capitalism recognises the ‘double’ character 
of freedom. To desire freedom is not only to expand the arena of choice (diversity) but it 
is also to make oneself governable (manageable). Hence the impossibility of 
governing/managing those who reject freedom (PPC: 221-222).   
IIII Struggle against Capitalist Subjectivity 
 
 Foucault sees postmodern struggles as struggles against what he calls 
“government of individualisation”, against a certain sort of subjectivisation, namely the 
way individuals are made subjects in modern capitalist societies (SP: 212). They are 
struggles against a certain self identification, against the notion of identity. Since the 
notion of identity is one of the tools used to impose singularity on diversity in the 
capitalist system, these are struggles that “assert the right to be different and they underlie 
everything which makes individuals truly individual” (SP: 211). 
 
 These are struggles which demand the legitimacy of and assert the right of, 
polymorphous experiences - infinite and numerous ways of being individual. To obstruct 
this is to obstruct the freedom of human beings, their right to be different. Essentially 
they are struggles against the notion of true scientific identity, true self etc; against the 
notion that there is a true self and that we ought to conform to that true self. This is the 
notion, which ties us to our own identity and forecloses our search to be different. Thus it 
imposes abstraction and generality on the individuals and obstructs the realisation of 
infinite possibilities of being individual, of being ourselves: “. . . all these struggles 
revolve around the question: Who are we? They are a refusal of these abstractions, of 
economic and ideological state violence which ignores who we are individually, and also 
a refusal of a scientific or administrative inquisition which determines who one is” (SP : 
212). 
 
 They are a refusal to accept any identity that ties the individual to a particular 
truth of self in such a way so as to foreclose the possibility of diverse forms of identity 
and hence different forms of being individual. The struggles are a refusal to subjugate to 
this blackmail any more and to assert “that the problem is not to recover our ‘lost’ 
identity, to free our imprisoned nature, our deepest truth; but instead, the problem is to 
move towards something radically Other” (RM: 12, 121-122).  
 
IV Post-modern Struggles and their Danger:  
 
 Foucault had hopes of post-modern social movements (PPC and PK) but there 
was disappointment related to these movements that haunted him in the later phase of his 
life. He saw the great danger facing these movements in their turning into what he 
pejoratively termed ‘liberation movements’ (see Kritzman: 1988: 14). Liberation 
movements, according to Foucault, are movements that do not recognise the double 
character of freedom and the double role that freedom plays in sustaining capitalist 
subjectivity. These movements consider freedom simply as a ‘way’ out, as an ‘exit’, 
without realising the formidable management potential of freedom. Consequently they 
end up being incorporated into an existing subjectivisation regime without realising their 
potential as movements aimed at producing a new subjectivity that can transcend the 
double bind of freedom (Badiou, 2001:106).  
  
 To think of power as purely a limit set on freedom leads to the notion that 
freedom consists in merely lifting this prohibition: a ‘way out’. But these notions are 
dangerous in the context of the workings of modern power, which does not work by 
‘starving’ desire but thrives on creating, inducing and multiplying desire. “This type of 
discourse”, according to Foucault, is a dangerous and “a formidable tool of control and 
power. As always, it uses what people say, feel and hope for. It exploits their temptation 
to believe that to be happy, it is enough to cross the threshold of discourse and remove a 
few prohibitions. But in fact it ends up dispersing movements of revolt and liberation” 
(PPC, 114 cf. HS, 3-35). 
 
 The danger of these movements consists in the fact that they are movements of 
freedom and liberation. This is dangerous precisely because these movements seem to be 
working with the false premise that capitalism essentially consists in the repression of 
freedom or as  
more perceptive of these would claim, it does not produce ‘real’ freedoms. However both 
assumptions are wrong because: 
 
a)  It is not true that capitalism is essentially based on curtailment and repression. To 
think that capitalism is merely a negativity is to miss its innovative character and hence to 
underestimate its power over individuals and society. Foucault’s rejection of the so called 
repressive hypothesis is in part derived from  
these considerations (HS: 3-37). 
 
 Foucault posits capitalism as a positive force (PPC: 262-263). The movements 
that do not realise this end up either being easily incorporated into the capitalist game or 
they become irrelevant, feeding on empty rhetoric, which does not harm capitalism. They 
are easily incorporated because capitalism is able to lift most of the repressions and 
prohibitions that these movements decry in the long run (PPC: 113-114). 
 
 
 
b) The second strategy is more dangerous than the first because it combines the 
shortcomings of the first with its own. The claim that capitalism does not grant real 
freedoms is factually wrong because capitalist freedoms are real freedoms (even if they 
are structured within the space of subjection to capital). To think otherwise would be to 
think of capitalism as a negativity and hence would be to underestimate it.  
 
 Second, to think that capitalism does not grant real freedoms is to commit oneself 
to the struggle for freedom, i.e. to the struggle for ‘real’ freedom, for more and more 
freedom. However this strategy plays the capitalism’s own game and is doomed to failure 
as it would either end up being incorporated into the game or would be rendered 
irrelevant and harmless. 
  This is so because capitalism rules through freedom, it rules through granting 
rights and freedoms and fulfilling people’s desires. It rules in the name of freedom, in the 
name of the enhancement and preservation of life. In sum it rules in the name of 
promoting our well being. It even kills in the name of freedom and life in the sense that in 
order to justify mass murders and wars it has to convince its subject that these are 
necessary to preserve life and freedom in the long run. The struggles waged in the name 
of freedom and life, are already playing on the turf of capitalism and are doomed to 
failure (HS: 137-138). 
 
 One of the main ingredients of the capitalist strategy of governing positively 
through enhancement and not through repression is the production of discourse about the 
truth of the individual, society and state. Capitalist strategy of governance consists in 
producing, reproducing and multiplying discourses and not curtailing and inhibiting or 
repressing discourses (see Rizvi, 2006). There are various functions of this constant 
multiplication of truth: 
 
a)  One of the main functions of capitalist governance is to normalise ideas i.e. to 
neutralise them, take the sting out of them etc. through placing them within the discourse 
and then constantly multiplying the discourse rather than repressing them. Repression is 
not a chosen strategy because it is not effective in the long run among other things. 
 
b)  In order to be normalised through discourse it is important that one speaks, 
expresses and produces a discourse. Capitalism cannot manage some one who refuses to 
speak, refuses to produce a discourse and refuses to ‘come out.’ Silence is what terrorises 
capitalism and not discourse. The horror that haunts capitalism is the horror of the 
unknown, that which cannot be situated in and explained within its discourse. Capitalism 
is the only ‘civilisation’ we know of that is compelled to produce and reproduce and 
multiply discourses about its real and imaginary enemies on such a large scale. It is 
important in order to normalise, ‘explain away’ and trivialise that the ‘other’ is brought in 
to discourse. 
 
 Thus, in a capitalist system one is instigated to speak.  Foucault talks about the 
obligation to speak in this context. Foucault also emphasises the importance of silence 
and speaks of the need to develop the culture and ethos of silence: “Silence…a specific 
form of experiencing relationships with others…I’m in favour of developing silence as a 
cultural ethos.” (PPC: 4).  
 Foucault also speaks of “lightning-flashes” that “open a void, a moment of 
silence, a question without an answer, provoke a breach without reconciliation where the 
world is forced to question itself.”(MC:  287). It is interesting to note that Habermas on 
the contrary characterises silence as a sign of fascism (see Milchman, 1994). In this 
context it is also worth remembering Heidegger’s silence and how it, to this day, 
scandalises for the bearers of normal discourse (see Lang, 1996).  
 
 Foucault’s attitude towards the gay movement and his calls for his ‘coming out’ 
and confession and his ambivalent attitude towards gay discourse is based on the reasons 
we have been discussing here (Kritzman, 1988). 
 
c)  Multiplication of discourse is also a technique to trivialise issues. Things are 
talked about and discourse is produced about issues in such abundance and from so many 
angles and with such constant repetition that it in the end loses any gravity. Abu Ghraib is 
a good recent good example of this. The multiple discourses that were produced in the 
aftermath of the events in the media, at the end, switched the focus from the issue and 
discourse becomes an endless exercise having very little connection with the reality of 
the event which fades away and is absorbed away in the complexity of the discourses 
(Zizek, 2004).  
 
 The movements, which consider capitalism as negativity, do not comprehend this 
game and end up being swallowed within the whirl of capitalist discourse. 
 
 Capitalism thrives on creating desires and multiplying them. Without the constant 
production and multiplication of new desires the capitalist system would dry up. It is 
important for the continuous production and reproduction of the system that each and 
every element of the system must keep ‘desiring’ more and more. The movements that 
turn into movements of safeguarding people’s rights and base their struggles on the 
charters of demands really enhance the functioning of the capitalist system (unless the 
demand is unconditional dissolution and overthrow of capitalism itself - the impossible 
demand). This is because they work on the false premises that capitalism suppresses 
desires. Foucault’s turn, in his later work, to the aesthetics of existence that would be 
based on voluntary asceticism and disciplining desires, was in part a response to this 
realisation (Foucault, 1988a).  
 
Conclusion: 
 There are grounds for mobilising the excluded and the disempowered (the 
mustadafeen) in movements of resistance but such movements – unlike post-modernism 
– will have to reject not just capitalism but all struggle for freedom. They will have to de-
legitimise freedom as the organising principle of human life at both the levels of society 
and the state. It needs a new legitimating principle but what that principle would be I 
would not talk about here. That is another story.  
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